THE PLOT

By the spring of 1967, the Arab states were promising to annihilate the Jewish State once and for all. The 1967 Six Day War was the culmination of a confusing array of events, rhetoric, politics, diplomatic failures, superpower meddling, and a host of other sources, and Israel’s leaders struggled to piece them all together. 

In 1967 the greatest threat seemed to be from Syria. The two countries had been engaged in low-level conflict for several years along their shared frontier in the Golan Heights. Israel’s leaders were divided about escalating to a more aggressive response to Syrian attacks. The Soviets began egging on the Syrians by falsely claiming that Israel was mobilizing its army to attack Syria. It wasn’t true and the Soviets knew it. But in the Cold War competition for influence in the Middle East, the Soviets had gone all-in with Syria, and were stoking conflict with Israel as a way to boost their sway with the Syrians. 

Meanwhile, Egypt and Israel were a bit like two boxers warily circling around each other in 1967. But standing in between them was the United Nations, which had a peacekeeping force in Gaza and the Sinai making sure that Egypt couldn’t launch an attack; that’s why Israel was more worried about Syria. 

During the annual Independence Day celebration on May 15, 1967, Israel received word that Egypt was sending tanks into the Sinai. This marked the beginning of what became known as the hamtanah, the three-week long waiting period before war broke out in June. The next day President Nasser ordered the UN peacekeeping force out of Sinai and Gaza. The UN didn’t object, cleared out, and left the area wide open for Egyptian forces to mobilize close to Israel. On May 22 Nasser blocked the port of Eilat by closing the Straits of Tiran — a move that Israel considered to be an act of war. Tensions were extremely high, as it was clear that war was at hand. Yitzhak Rabin, the IDF Chief of Staff, had a nervous breakdown but recovered the next day. 

Israel wanted to pursue a diplomatic route to ensure political support from the United States and the major European countries. At first the US, France, and Britain insisted that Israel not be the one to shoot first; none of them would sell Israel weapons. This was a repudiation of the security promises made in the wake of the Sinai Campaign. 

On May 27 Prime Minister Levi Eshkol took to the airwaves to explain to Israelis why his government was pursuing a policy of restraint in response to the threats. The speech, which he hadn’t had time to practice, was a disaster, becoming known as the “Stammering Speech.” Israeli morale sank, convincing the Arabs to keep up the threats. It also tanked Israelis’ confidence in the government, leading to a political crisis. For the first time in Israeli history, a unity government was formed — that is, a government made up of both the left-wing ruling party and the right-wing opposition. Moshe Dayan, hero of the 1956 war, was brought in to serve as Defense Minister.

As May crossed into June and it was clear that diplomacy wouldn’t reduce the threats against Israel, the United States indicated that it wouldn’t object to Israel striking first. Israel had finally reached a breaking point. For seven hours on June 4, 1967, Levi Eshkol and Moshe Dayan drafted a war plan, and Israel’s leadership gave them the go-ahead to attack.

THE PEOPLE

Moshe Dayan: had been IDF Chief of Staff during the successful 1956 Sinai Campaign, was brought into the unity government to serve as Minister of Defense.

Abba Eban: Israeli Foreign Minister who flew to Paris, London, and Washington during the hamtanah to garner political support for Israel. 

Levi Eshkol: Prime Minister of Israel, whose hasty “Stammering Speech” left the country feeling demoralized on the eve of war.

Gamal Abdel Nasser: President of Egypt, he was determined to reverse his humiliation at being defeated by Israel in the 1956 Sinai Campaign. Declared that Egypt’s basic objective was to destroy Israel.

Yitzhak Rabin: Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces, highest ranking officer overseeing Israel’s defense.

THE BIG IDEAS

Part of the security guarantees offered to Israel after the 1956 Sinai Campaign was the presence of a United Nations peacekeeping force in the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip. That would prevent Egypt from building up military forces close to Israel’s border. On May 16 the UN pulled out as requested by President Nasser of Egypt, leaving the area wide open for Egypt to mobilize its forces. It clouded forever Israelis’ trust in the UN.

Israel was forced to mobilize its military reserves in the run-up to the war. Although military service is compulsory for most Israeli men and women, Israel’s standing army is quite small. In crisis Israel has to rely on its reserves, who are civilians. Calling up the reserves, therefore, imposes a huge economic cost, as people leave their jobs and families. During the hamtanah, so many reserves were on duty that the economy began collapsing. 

The hamtanah (“Waiting Period”) refers to the three-week period of intense pressure, threats, and tension between mid-May and early-June, 1967. The Arab states were promising to annihilate Israel, and Israel was forced to mobilize its reserves at huge cost to the economy.  Israeli morale sank and prompted a political crisis that saw the first unity government in Israeli history. The hamtanah ended when Israel launched the Six Day War.

FUN FACTS

Yitzhak Rabin was said to have chain-smoked 70 cigarettes on the day of his nervous breakdown. 

Israel didn’t show off its tanks at the annual Independence Day parade — which led the Arabs states to mistakenly conclude that the tanks must instead be off preparing for war.

Menachem Begin suggested that David Ben Gurion, his arch-nemesis, be brought back as Prime Minister to weather the crisis. 

© Jason Harris 2020