How should Israel respond to terrorism? The government was divided in its response to attacks from Jordan and Egypt: aggressive retaliation, or restraint and diplomacy?
THE PLOT
The question of how Israel should deal with terrorism arose from the beginning of the state, but really came to a head in the mid-1950s. By then armed incursions by fedayeen (terrorists) into Israeli territory became a daily occurrence, and resulted in the murder of dozens of innocent Israelis. Israel in turn often retaliated against the Arab villages from where the fedayeen staged their attacks.
Moshe Dayan led the “activist” wing of Israel’s security establishment, who advocated for a policy of retaliation that would cause the Arab civilian population to turn against the infiltrators, and would pressure the respective Arab governments to tighten up their end of the border. The activists were opposed by the moderates, led by Moshe Sharett, who believed that retaliation didn’t deter attacks, collective punishment was unjust, and that it made Israel look bad in the eyes of the world.
The activists won the argument and Unit 101 was created to carry out harsh reprisals to make the Arabs pay a heavy price for attacking Israel. On October 14, 1953, Unit 101 raided the Palestinian village of Qibya, a known base for Jordanian fighters and fedayeen, A battle broke out and 69 Palestinians were killed, mostly civilians. Domestic and international outrage followed, and Israel changed its policy to only allow retaliation against military targets.
On March 17, 1954, a bus filled with Israeli civilians was ambushed at Scorpions Ascent in the Negev Desert. Most of the passengers were brutally murdered. The massacre at Scorpions Ascent begged for a powerful and ruthless response, Sharett opted for restraint, and Israel did not retaliate.
In the meantime fedayeen attacks were starting to come more often from Egyptian territory in Gaza, terrifying Israelis near the border. On February 28, 1955, the IDF launched Operation Black Arrow against an Egyptian military base in Gaza. It was a huge defeat and embarrassment for Egypt, and now Egypt and Israel began striking each other, in addition to the fedayeen raids that continued against Israel.
On April 29, 1956, fedayeen ambushed and murdered Roi Rotberg, a resident at Kibbutz Nahal Oz near the Gaza frontier. Moshe Dayan’s eulogy at his funeral became one of the great speeches of Israeli history, speaking to the uncertainties, vulnerabilities, and resolve of the present moment.
The ultimate result of the fedayeen attacks and Israel’s retaliation was to dramatically raise the tension between Israel and Egypt to the boiling point. By the fall of 1956 the two countries would be at war.
THE PEOPLE
King Abdullah I: king of Jordan, assassinated by a Palestinian gunman in 1951 for trying to make peace with Israel.
Moshe Dayan: Chief of Staff of the IDF. One of Israel’s most famous military and political figures, instantly recognizable thanks to the black eye patch covering a war wound. He was a leader of the activist wing who advocated a policy of retaliation against terrorism.
Fedayeen: a name meaning “self-sacrifice,” they were mostly-Palestinian terrorists who infiltrated into Israel to attack and murder Israeli civilians during the 1950s. They were often aided by the Jordanian and Egyptian military.
Roi Rotberg: 21-year old security guard at Kibbutz Nahal Oz, who was ambushed and murdered by fedayeen in April, 1956, and at whose funeral Moshe Dayan delivered a famous eulogy.
Moshe Sharett: Israeli Foreign Minister (and then Prime Minister) who disagreed with the policy of maximum retaliation and instead urged restraint.
Ariel Sharon: commander of Unit 101, known for his aggressive tactics and heroic actions during the War of Independence.
THE BIG IDEAS
By the mid-1950s Israel’s security establishment is divided between two types of people: activists and moderates. Activists believe that the Arabs only understand the language of force, and that aggressive response to acts of violence are required to ensure Israel’s defense. Moderates agree that Israel’s defense has to be strong, but they emphasize diplomacy and restraint. They believe that retaliation isn’t effective, doesn’t deter Arab attacks, and instead only earns Israel the world’s moral outrage.
On the one hand Israelis generally supported retaliation as part of a policy of strong defense. Retaliation boosted morale. It made Israelis feel a bit less vulnerable in the face of terror that can, and did, strike anywhere at a moment’s notice. But their tolerance for retaliation stopped at the indiscriminate killing of innocent civilians, like at Qibya.
Israel faced almost no good options in dealing with terrorism. There was a downside no matter how Israel responded. Not responding at all was unthinkable. But it was impossible to find a response that didn’t come at a high cost to Israel, whether it meant its soldiers getting killed, or the world condemning it, or the Arabs retaliating for the retaliation, or simply the expense and exhaustion of the constant pattern of terrorist attack followed by retaliation followed by another attack, and so on.
FUN FACTS
To get into Unit 101, you not only had to pass the intensive training requirements but the other members of the unit got to vote on whether or not to accept you.
© Jason Harris 2020