Current Events, Episode 162
israel at war, EXPLAINED: options for gaza
November 5, 2023
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Israel’s ground invasion of Gaza is underway. It is difficult, dangerous, and deadly fighting that has already claimed dozens of Israeli soldiers. The goal is to eliminate Hamas. But what about afterwards? Today we’ll look at five options for post-war Gaza.
Hi everyone, dialing in with a cold today, so please bear with the degraded audio. Israel’s ground war against Hamas in Gaza is finally underway. At this point reports are that the Israeli army has converged around Gaza City, the Strip’s biggest city and Hamas’ home base, effectively cutting Gaza in two. It is a densely packed urban environment riddled with terrorist infrastructure, including perhaps hundreds of miles of underground tunnels. It is enormously difficult fighting terrain, terrifying and dangerous. Israel has the military capabilities to win, through the fight will be — as it already is —- high in casualties.
And so the questions are: why is Israel going in? What are they looking to achieve? We have to understand this in the context of three elements: the short-term goals, that is, what to do about Hamas. Then the medium-term goal, which is what to do with Gaza once the main fighting is over. And then the long-term goal: how to ensure Gaza is peaceful under a Palestinian government that works for the Palestinian people, not against Israel. Israel hasn’t articulated much beyond the short-term goal of eliminating Hamas, and we know that there aren’t any easy scenarios looking ahead. Then best case might be a long, drawn-out, complicated international effort to govern Gaza, rebuild the area, manage its economy, and achieve a stable political system.
But ultimately, Gaza cannot be fixed without achieving the same stability in the West Bank. That requires an end to Israel’s 56-year occupation there. That, in turn, requires wholesale changes in Israeli politics and its relationship to the settlements and the settlers. The Palestinians, for their part, will also have to change, permanently giving up violence and creating and enforcing the conditions for neighborly coexistence, while ensuring good governance for the Palestinian people. All of this requires the cooperation of the global community: an end to Iran’s terrorism and hate, an end to the United Nation’s one-sided opposition to Israel, financial support and heavy involvement from the Arab countries, and the kinds of support that only the Western powers like the United States, Britain, France, and Germany, can provide. We might be talking about the work of generations.
But in the meantime, Israel is engaged in heavy fighting in Gaza. Hamas continues firing streams of rockets into Israel. More than 220 hostages remain in Gaza, their fates unknown. Iran has ordered its terrorist army in Yemen, the Houthis, to throw themselves into this war, lobbing missiles at Israel’s southern coast. Iran’s army in Lebanon, Hezbollah, continues to attack Israel on the daily, threatening a wider war that, so far, they are stopping short of. Israel has mobilized hundreds of thousands of soldiers, while some 200,000 Israelis are displaced from their homes around Gaza and the Lebanese border. The economy is starting to hurt. Israel’s right-wing extremists are attacking Palestinians in the West Bank, as Prime Minister Netanyahu refuses to accept any responsibility for the massacre on October 7, an abdication of leadership that I don’t think Israel has ever experienced in its history.
So as usual, lots to discuss, each of which could be its own episode. It’s Day 29 of the war against Hamas. I’m your host, Jason Harris, and this is Jew Oughta Know.
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Why did Israel go into Gaza, when every headline for weeks has said that it’s a trap? For one, I’m not sure that it is a trap in the sense that Hamas designed this outcome. Sure, Hamas wants to provoke Israel into over-reacting and killing as many Palestinians as possible. But the terrorists weren’t looking to be destroyed, and there’s no evidence that they were planning for a fight to the bitter end. It seems unlikely that they intentionally provoked Israel into this level of warfare. Israel is going into Gaza because the government thinks this is the best way to eliminate Hamas once and for all.
Plenty of commentators have suggested that there are scenarios in which Israel doesn’t need to destroy Hamas, and that anyway such a goal is impossible. But given the brutality of Hamas’ attack on October 7, Israel has concluded that it is in an existential war: that either Israel can exist, or Hamas can exist, but both cannot. A spokesman for Hamas announced this week that October 7 was just the beginning, and that a second, third, and fourth massacre will be in Israel’s future. And so as long as Hamas runs Gaza, Israelis cannot safely live in their own homes. And the Palestinians, too, will be condemned to permanent tyranny and misery. When you are beheading children, you are forfeiting any right to continue to exist. There is no long-term strategy that can accommodate Hamas’ presence anymore.
The challenge, of course, is how to do it. There are two broad methods here: Israel has to eliminate Hamas’ ability to make war, and has to eliminate their ability to rebuild themselves after this phase is over. So Israel has to destroy as much of Hamas’ infrastructure as possible: weapons and communications and tunnels and stockpiles and vehicles — absolutely anything and everything that can be used to support their activities. And you have to kill as many of them as possible. It’s not possible to kill every last Hamas fighter, nor every last Hamas supporter. While some have argued for just targeting Hamas’ leaders, that strategy will no longer work: new leaders will simply rise to replace the dead ones. Israel has to kill enough Hamas fighters that the organization falls apart, and cannot reconstitute itself once a new governing authority takes over Gaza. Some of this can be accomplished with air strikes, as we’ve seen. But ultimately, you have to be on the ground, going into the tunnels to root them out one by one.
But the scholar Donniel Hartman of the Shalom Hartman Institute points out that Israel has another goal: to save the hostages. And the tension right now is that the goal of eliminating Hamas and the goal of saving the hostages might not be compatible. He said, “I think it reflects the ambivalence in Israeli society. At another era, we would have said, no. And we can’t do them both, and we would have chosen. But now we want both.” There may not be a military strategy that can achieve both. The more Hamas is pushed up against the wall, the greater the danger that they will just execute the hostages. It’s an unspeakable horror that Israel is sitting with right now, and yet polls show that the vast majority of Israelis are committed to destroying Hamas whatever the cost.
Now, with the ground operation underway in Gaza, we’re hearing lots of calls for a cease-fire. Let me be cynical for a moment: this always happens whenever Israel gets the upper hand, by the way. No one ever calls for a cease-fire when Israel is the one being attacked. Still, there is no doubt that Israel has pounded Gaza hard these last few weeks. Entire neighborhoods have been leveled in order to destroy Hamas’ terrorist infrastructure. And while we can’t say with certainty how many Palestinian civilians have been killed — as opposed to Hamas fighters — we can be sure it’s a tragic amount. A cease-fire is theoretically intended for humanitarian purposes: to allow a safe window to bring in more aid, and for the opportunity to continue negotiating for a release of the hostages.
So far Israel has refused a cease-fire. The government says that any cease-fire benefits Hamas by giving it time to rest, regroup, maneuver, and shore up their defenses. A cease-fire would leave the Israeli soldiers in Gaza sitting ducks. And the families of the hostages have demanded no cease-fire until Hamas releases the hostages. These families are rapidly becoming a movement, staging constant protests around the country to make sure that the hostages’ lives are part of Israel’s strategy and not dismissed as collateral damage.
Dennis Ross is a former American diplomat and Middle East peace negotiator. He, too, is opposed to a cease-fire. He writes, “At present, [Hamas’] military infrastructure still exists, its leadership remains largely intact, and its political control of Gaza is unchallenged. … The Strip will remain impoverished, and the next round of war will be inevitable, holding both Gazan civilians and much of the rest of the Middle East hostage to Hamas’ aims.”
So a cease-fire does not seem to be in the immediate future, but that could quickly change. In any case, Israel is relentlessly focused on destroying Hamas. But then what? Hanging over all this is the question of what happens once Hamas is eliminated. As usual, there aren’t any easy, solid, or good answers.
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There’s no doubt that given enough time Israel’s military will smash Hamas. They won’t kill everyone — some fighters will manage to get away. The United States said that Hamas compiled a list of people needing to be evacuated from Gaza to Egypt on humanitarian grounds, including foreign nationals and seriously wounded people. One-third of that list were Hamas terrorists, whom the group tried to smuggle in Egypt in the backs of ambulances. Luckily they were caught in time. The United States has also revealed that Hamas tried to bring oxygen tanks into Gaza — not for use in hospitals, but to provide breathable air to the tunnels. Still, Israel, Egypt, and the United States have so far enabled several hundred trucks into Gaza to deliver humanitarian supplies. The Israeli army attempted to open a corridor for Gazan civilians to move from the north, where the fighting is, to the south. But Hamas attacked the corridor to try to shut it down. Israel announced it would try to re-establish the safe zone soon.
So at some point Hamas will be so degraded that it can neither wage war against Israel, rebuild itself, or govern Gaza. But then what happens? You’ll hear five main options discussed, and this is what we’ll do for the rest of the episode.
The first is that Israel reoccupies Gaza the way it did from 1967-2005. This would involve more than just a military occupation, though, as Israel would also have to govern the territory. This raises tons of questions. Would Israel rebuild Jewish settlements? Would Palestinians be forced out? How harsh would the military force have to be to ensure that no terrorist insurgency rises up? How much would it all cost?
Luckily there seems to be no serious consideration of this option. Few Israelis except the most right-wing fanatics actually want to reoccupy Gaza.
The second option is that Israel defeats Hamas and then just leaves Gaza. Some argue for a complete separation in which Israel seals its side of the border. Nothing gets in or out: no more Israeli electricity going into Gaza, no more Palestinian workers coming out. From now on Gaza can look to Egypt for its outside connection to the rest of the world. Let Gaza be someone else’s problem.
This has the benefit of being psychologically satisfying — a complete divorce, in which Israelis no longer has to think about the Palestinians in Gaza. If they’re miserable, let the world blame Egypt for not supplying enough resources. Who, after all, can reasonably ask or expect Israelis to deal with Gaza anymore? The problem, of course, is that this option is also unworkable. If Israel leaves, Hamas will rebuild itself, or another tyrannical group will take its place. And we’ll be right back where we started.
So Israel can’t occupy Gaza and also can’t leave it alone. That leaves us with three remaining choices.
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So after Israel defeats Hamas, however long that takes, we have have five options. We’ve dismissed two as unpalatable. But we’re left with a situation in which someone needs to govern Gaza, and that someone cannot be Israel. So we have three options left.
Israel has suggested it wants to see the Palestinian Authority put in charge. The PA currently governs the Palestinian areas of the West Bank, and it was briefly in charge of Gaza before Hamas came to power and kicked them out. This option seems to make sense: having a single, moderate, secular Palestinian government, one that closely cooperates on security with Israel, would really simplify things. The PA is a known entity, one that Israel can deal with.
The problem here, though, is multi-dimensional. The PA doesn’t particularly want to take over Gaza: too much bad blood from the civil war fought with Hamas back in 2006. The PA has already lost control of parts of the West Bank to Hamas and other Palestinian extremists, a fate that would await it again in Gaza. The Palestinians themselves also hate the PA even more than they hate Hamas. It’s already seen as corrupt, inept, and authoritarian. Taking over Gaza at the behest of Israel would make it look like a puppet of the Zionists. All of this is a recipe for more instability and violence.
But if not the Palestinian Authority, perhaps there are still other Palestinian figures who could constitute a government, and could work in cooperation with Israel, Egypt, and the international community, for our fourth option. There are popular figures on the Palestinian side. One of them is Salam Fayyad, a former prime minister and probably the single best leader the Palestinians ever had. He is opposed to violence, and condemned without equivocation the October 7 massacre. He was always focused on building successful government, police, and economic institutions in the West Bank, believing that such efforts would gradually result in the creation of a Palestinian state alongside Israel. In other words, two-states, not just one-state. Eminently moderate, he was sidelined about a decade ago as a political threat to the current President of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas. There is another guy, Marwan Barghouti, who is incredibly popular with Palestinians and has often been suggested as someone who could unify the Palestinian people once President Abbas dies. The problem with Barghouti is that he is currently serving five life terms for masterminding terrorist attacks that killed several dozen Israelis.
The Israeli scholar Tomer Persico writes that either the PA or some other Palestinian government is the only way. “It won’t be easy, but this is the only way to stabilize the region: Bringing in the PA or creating a body like the PA that is not fed by religious fundamentalism but by a national concept, that wants an independent state and is ready to reach an agreement with Israel. As during the Oslo process, the horizon promised must be a state (demilitarized, with security arrangements, etc.), and as with any agreement with its neighbors, it won’t mean they will suddenly start loving Israel. It means that there will be a secure border and the beginning of a long road to reasonable neighborliness.”
This might be the best outcome, our fourth option here. But it is also very unlikely. The Economist writes that, “The Palestinians have been divided for almost two decades. The split is largely their fault: though Hamas and PA leaders meet every couple of years to pay lip service to reconciliation, neither party wants to compromise. But the schism has also been exacerbated by the divide-and-rule policy of Binyamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister, who thought it a useful tool to stymie the Palestinian dream of an independent state.” In other words, the Palestinians don’t really have it together to take over Gaza, which would be an unbelievable challenge even to a committed, effective, and stable government.
So of our five options, we’ve eliminated four. Occupying Gaza. Leaving Gaza altogether. Having the Palestinian Authority take it over. And throwing together some kind of other Palestinian government that would be both popular and peaceful. That leaves us with one idea left.
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Dennis Ross, the American diplomat and Middle East peace negotiators — and, by the way, a former professor of mine — envisions a Palestinian government taking over in Gaza, but one backstopped by a huge international coalition of both Arab and non-Arab countries. He imagines Palestinian technocrats running an interim government that would prevent a power vacuum while beginning the huge task of rebuilding Gaza. He suggests that the United States mobilize and organize this coalition, creating the necessary division of labor. He writes, “For example, Morocco, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain could provide police — not military forces — to ensure security for the new civil administration and those responsible for reconstruction. Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E and Qatar could provide the bulk of the funding for reconstruction, explaining their roles as necessary to relieve the suffering of the Palestinians in Gaza and help them recover. Canada and others could provide monitoring mechanisms to ensure that assistance would go to its intended purposes.”
This effort would need to begin right away once the fighting is over. Ross writes, “Getting aid into Gaza quickly and starting the reconstruction effort as soon as the fighting stops could help show residents that life can get better when Hamas is no longer preventing the rebuilding of Gaza. “
The problem with all this, of course, is its complexity. And it’s dependent on Hamas being completely eliminated, or at least defeated so definitively that it both cannot make war, cannot govern Gaza, but also cannot spoil the postwar efforts. It also requires by-in from the Palestinians — no small thing given their level of anger and hatred towards Israel, and their long history of betrayal by their own leaders and the international community.
And ultimately, much of what happens next in Gaza depends on what Israel does now. Israel has to conduct the war with the highest regard for Palestinian civilians. That means continuing to allow in humanitarian aid — and at a faster pace than what is currently happening. That means avoiding as much as possible killing civilians — a very difficult proposition given how Hamas uses civilians as human shields, and how immensely difficult an urban ground war is. Israel’s soldiers are in grave danger, and Hamas has littered Gaza with traps designed to kill them. But the most important thing Israel can do is provide a light at the end of the tunnel. A way out of the permanent state of Palestinian misery.
Dennis Ross writes, “Israel’s political leaders need to clearly and publicly emphasize they will leave Gaza and lift the siege after Hamas has been militarily defeated and largely disarmed. They must communicate that they understand a political resolution is needed with the Palestinians more generally. That is not a message Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is now conveying, given the shock in Israel and the makeup of his government. But it is one Israel’s partners in the region need to hear — and soon.”
So these are the five options. Israeli occupation. Israeli disengagement. The Palestinian Authority taking over. Some other Palestinian leaders taking over. Or a Palestinian administration backed by long-term international support and an Israeli government that promises — and delivers — a better future. And that means zooming out beyond Gaza, to the morass that is the West Bank. Israel’s occupation and the corrupt Palestinian government require a solution for that area, too. Which may ultimately prove just as hard as destroying Hamas. But that’s a topic for another episode later on.
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All of Israel is waiting with bated breath. Donniel Hartman and Yossi Klein Halevi are calling it the “Sword of Damocles,” meaning the sense of dread that comes from imminent danger. Yossi Klein Halevi says if October 7 doesn’t lead to bringing down Hamas, then Israel sends the message to the Middle East that they don’t have it in them anymore to survive in the region. This explains why 70% of Israelis support fighting until victory, knowing full well that’s going to mean taking heavy losses. Donniel Hartman says that, “something else is now part of the Israeli consciousness. It’s not just the mourning. It’s not just the conviction that we cannot allow Hamas to be there. And we just can’t imagine going back to life with an evil force, willing and capable of killing indiscriminately. That’s still there. But if you want to understand what’s in Israel today, there’s the price.” What he means is that the whole country is steeling itself for the casualties coming out of Gaza, the young men in their late teens and early twenties who have already begun dying in battle, so far about a dozen a day.
So it’s all tough going. Hamas has to be defeated for Israel’s sake and for the Palestinians’. Plenty more to talk about here, stay tuned for more episodes coming. Appreciate all the kind words people are sending me, especially those writing in from Israel. You’re not alone.
As always, I’m at jewoughtaknow.com and my email is jewoughtaknowpodcast@gmail.com. Thanks for listening everyone. Am Yisrael Chai — the Jewish People live.
© Jason Harris 2023